国有资产产权：中央与地方关系研究

           史言信博士      研究方向：政府规制

  成果简介

    党的十六大明确提出，改革国有资产管理体制是深化经济体制改革的重大任务，要在坚持国家所有的前提下，充分发挥中央和地方两个积极性。国家要通过制定法律法规，建立中央政府和地方政府分别代表国家履行出资人职责，享有所有者权益，权力、义务和责任相统一，管资产和管人、管事相结合的国有资产管理体制。在这一体制背景下，研究中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系就具有重要的理论和现实意义。

本文分为五章：一、导言；二、国有资产中央与地方产权关系的基本理论；三、我国中央与地方国有资产产权关系沿革与现状；四、经验与启示：中央与地方国有资产产权关系案例研究；五、中央与地方国有资产产权关系改革的政策建议。论文的主要内容如下：

国有经济是国家引导、推动经济和社会发展的基本工具，是实现人民根本利益和共同富裕的重要保证。发展壮大国有经济，国有经济控制经济命脉，对于发挥社会主义制度优越性，增强我国经济实力、国防力量和民族凝聚力，具有关键作用。国有企业作为国有经济的具体载体，体现国有经济的主导作用。改革开放以来，为适应市场经济的需要，我国推行公有制的多种有效实现形式，国有企业不断深化改革，取得了显著的成效。

与此相对应，我国的国有资产监督管理体制改革一直在探索中进行，是一个不断深化和发展的过程。建国初期，作为计划经济体制的一部分建立起来的国有资产管理体制，是国家代表全体人民行使对国有资产的最终所有权，中央政府和地方政府分别被赋予管理中央和地方国有资产的权限。虽然中央和地方对哪些国有资产属于各自的管理权限一直没有明晰的界定，但在长期的实际运行中，归中央管理的是“中央企业”，归地方管理的是“地方企业”。哪些企业归中央管理，哪些企业归地方管理，在几十年的历史中经常会有变动，中央和地方的行政分权改革都是围绕国有企业管理权归属问题展开的。国有资产要么是在国家统一所有的前提下的分级管理，要么是由中央统一管理，中央和地方之间进行权利划分。但从总体上看,长期以来或者是“统一所有，分级管理”，或者是“统一所有，分级监管”，只是有时中央管得多点，有时地方管得多点。

党的十六大以来，国有资产管理在理论上有新的突破，体现在所有权的理论问题上，明确了国家统一所有、政府分级履行出资人职责的国有资产管理的新思想。这个思想有利于做到分权合理、集中有度、责权明确，有利于充分调动中央和地方的积极性。国有资产管理改革实践中也取得了较大的成绩，初步构建了新的国有资产监管机构的组织框架，国有资产监管法规进一步完善，建立落实了国有资产经济责任的业绩考核等相关制度，进一步加强了国有企业监事会工作，加强了国有资产的基础管理，国有产权交易的监管工作得到加强。

在新的国有资产管理体制下，中央和地方国有产权的终极所有权属于国家，因此，其根本利益是一致的。但是由于具有不同的出资人代表，中央和地方产权的利益机制就存在差异。由此可见，中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系既不同于市场化的产权关系，也不同于原有体制下的准行政隶属关系。新的国有资产管理体制改革还处于初级阶段，相关的制度建设也还没有跟进，中央和地方产权关系不可能很快理顺。因此，需要根据中央和地方之间国有产权关系中存在的问题，探求其内在的深层次的制度性原因，制定并实施相应的改革措施。

通过对江西铜业、江西钨业和昌河汽车股份有限公司这三个典型的企业进行实地调研，本文对中央和地方之间国有产权关系中存在的问题进行了概括，主要包括中央与地方国有产权之间的流动机制不健全，中央与地方政府产权主体的利益冲突以及产权划分不合理等问题。这些问题的存在将会增加中央与地方国有资产产权的交易成本、降低国有产权效率并降低中央与地方国有产权关系同市场经济体制的兼容性。

根据马克思产权理论中的制度变迁理论、生产力评价标准，西方产权理论中的交易费用理论、契约理论、企业控制权和索取权理论以及政府职能理论，合理的国有产权制度安排应该符合以下几个要求：

1、产权主体必须明确，产权边界必须清晰，这就要求必须明确要有人或机构负责行使产权。

2、产权必须能自由流动。这就要求产权主体必须多元化，没有多元化的产权主体，就无法进行产权交易，市场机制也无法有效运转起来。

3、企业内部的产权结构安排必须合理，并形成完善的法人治理结构。

4、产权必须受到相应法律的保护，交易必须受到法律的维护。

5、产权的组合及其结构的演变必须有利于企业经济效率的提高。

结合上述的理论结论，本文认为，中央与地方国有产权关系中所存在的问题是由于公有产权制度不完善和相关的制度改革滞后造成的。具体说来，主要包括中央与地方政府的权责设置不合理，财税制度不完善，社会保障体制改革滞后以及中央与地方国有产权利益协调机制缺失等原因。

在对中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系的历史沿革、现状、国有资产管理理论分析以及案例研究的基础上，本文提出了中央与地方之间国有资产产权关系改革的目标、原则和总体思路。

中央和地方产权关系改革的目标：建立中央和地方国有资产边界合理、中央和地方政府的权责明确并与市场经济体制相兼容的协调共生发展关系。为确保这一目标的实现，在改革过程中需要遵循以下原则：国有资本总体效益最大化原则，兼顾中央和地方利益的原则，国有资本出资人市场平等原则。

中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系改革的总体思路：

1、建立健全现代国有产权制度。产权理论和我国的改革实践都已表明，健全的产权制度是市场有效配置资源的基础，建立与现代市场经济相适应的国有产权制度是经济体制改革不可回避的问题。改革国有产权制度，就是要清晰产权，界定产权边界和产权主体的权利与义务关系，消除原来模糊不清的状态，建立起有利于社会资源优化配置的财产约束机制。当前我国经济体制改革和经济运行中出现的若干突出问题，都直接或间接与这方面的改革滞后有关。因此，只有通过构建新型国有资产管理体系、完善现代国有产权制度，才能够在国有企业内部建立现代企业制度，这是理顺中央和地方国有产权关系的基础。

2、明晰界定中央和地方国有资产边界。根据党的十六届三中全会的精神，关系国民经济命脉和国家安全的大型国有企业、基础设施和重要自然资源等，由中央政府代表国家履行出资人职责，其它国有资产由地方政府代表国家履行出资人职责。由于中央和地方国有企业改革还没有完成，特别是中央企业存在产业布局分散和内部效率低下等问题，还处于改制和重组阶段。中央国有资本涉足的领域必将收缩和精简，实现中央国有资本对国民经济的“控制力、影响力和带动力”的落脚点在于中央企业的合理产业布局，也就是要确定中央企业进入的经济领域并明确在这些领域的进入深度。在中央企业重组过程中必然会发生中央和地方产权关系的调整，这是我国国有经济布局调整的重要内容，也是完善国有资产管理体制的途径。中央和地方国有资产调整是双向的，即中央国有资产转化为地方国有资产形态或者地方国有资产转换为中央资产，其中以前者为主，转换途径包括行政划拨和市场交易。

3、确立中央政府对国有资产的权利和义务。在“国家统一所有，分别行使产权，专门机构监管，授权委托经营”的国有资产管理体制框架下，中央政府履行中央国有资产出资人职责，对所辖国有资产具有收益、处置和考核等项管理职权。当前，国务院国资委监管重要中央企业，对部分大型企业和企业集团进行授权经营。因此，中央政府对于国有资产的权利和义务主要表现为进一步提高国有资产的代理效率、促进中央企业重组和理顺经营性资产与非经营性资产的转换途径。同时，国务院还代表国家统一行使国有资产的终极所有权。

4、明确地方政府对国有资产的权利和义务。新的国有资产管理体制确立了地方政府投资主体的地位，扩大了其配置资源的范围和权力，刺激了地方政府管理国有资产的积极性，有利于推动地方国有资产战略布局的合理化，促进国有资产形态的多样化和提高国有资产的效率。但是，由于地方政府承担发展地方经济和确保社会稳定等职能，其出资人代表身份与行政职能的矛盾很难避免。地方政府的出资人权利现在仍然不同程度地被计划发展部门、财政部门、组织人事部门以及行政主管部门分割占有。因此，明确地方国有资产监督管理机构的职责，围绕如何更好地履行出资人职责来设置内部机构，理顺监管机构和相关政府部门的关系，从而有效地促进地方政府的行政职能和出资人职责的分离，有利于深化地方国有资产管理体制改革，促进中央和地方国有产权关系的协调发展。

5、促进中央和地方国有产权的流动。中央和地方国有产权流动是调整国有经济布局和完善国有公司治理结构的必然要求，流动形式包括行政划拨和市场机制。当前的国有产权流动还主要发生在中央企业之间，以行政划拨为主，但是随着中央企业重组的进一步深入，中央和地方国有产权之间的流动将更加普遍。因此，促进国有企业股份制改造和完善公司治理结构相结合，加快股权分置改革，探索地方国有资产参与中央企业重组的形式，建立中央与地方产权流动的利益协调机制，对于解决国有企业的内部机制问题，促进中央和地方国有产权的流动具有重要意义。

6、实现“分级所有”是中央和地方产权关系改革的最终目标。我国现行的国有资产管理体制遵循的原则是“国家所有、分级履行出资人职责”，单从经济的角度考虑，建立“分级履行出资人职责”体制的主要目的是为了使得上级政府（尤其是中央政府）有一定程度的行动灵活性，从而增加其调控的能力。然而这种体制还是可能影响下级政府行使出资人职责的积极性。因此，从产权和管理体制效率的角度考虑，可以在制度和经济条件允许的情况下，实现中央和地方国有资产“分级所有”的改革目标，即中央和地方政府是市场意义上完全平等的国有资产产权主体。

中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系改革只是我国国有资产管理体制改革这一系统工程中的一部分，因此还需要相关的制度改革予以支持和推进，主要包括建立健全国有资产管理法律体系、完善中央和地方财政税收制度、结合中央和地方产权关系改革养老保障体制以及制定统一的国有资本预算制度。

本文的创新之处表现在以下几个方面：

1.突破了传统的从国有企业的微观视角和国有经济的宏观视角去研究国有产权问题，在“国家统一所有，中央和地方政府分别行使出资人职责”的新型国有资产管理体制下，综合产权理论、委托－代理理论、政府职能理论以及现有国有资产管理研究成果，从中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系的崭新视角，来研究中央和地方产权关系的本质、问题、原因以及改革思路，这不但更好地体现了我国国有资产管理体制改革的思路，促进国有资产管理体制改革的进一步深化，而且符合当前中央和地方国有企业重组改制的实践需要。

2.提出中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系的改革目标：建立中央和地方国有资产的合理边界、中央和地方政府的权责明确并且与市场经济体制相兼容的中央和地方产权的协调共生发展关系，这具有开创性意义。中央和地方国有资产的终极所有权属于国家，它们的最终目标是一致的，而又具有不同的出资人代表。因此它们之间不是普通的市场产权关系，也不是原有体制下的准行政性关系，确立符合市场经济基本原则、资产边界合理以及出资人职责明确的中央和地方产权协调共生发展关系是新型国有资产管理体制的要求，也丰富了国有产权理论和我国国有资产管理理论研究的内容。

3.针对我国国有资产管理体制的机制设计上的缺陷，提出构建“四层次”的国有资产管理体制，促进政企、政资的彻底分离。现行的国有资产管理体制并没有从根本上解决政企、政资不分的问题，国务院国资委还会同时肩负出资人和行政职能，这一体制缺陷在今后的改革中会逐渐显示出来。因此，本文提出“四层次”的国有资产管理体制，有利于促进政企和政资分离，建立与市场经济体制相兼容的中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系。

本文着重就中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系进行深入研究，研究成果具有较大的理论价值和实践意义，从理论价值上看，以促进中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系改革为出发点，综合产权理论、委托－代理理论、国有资产管理理论、政府职能理论，分析中央和地方国有资产产权关系中的问题，提出中央和地方产权关系改革的总体目标和思路，推动了我国国有资产管理体制研究的进一步发展，并丰富了与本项目相关的产权理论、行政管理学和公共选择理论等学术领域的研究内容。从实践意义看，诊断与分析了中央和地方之间产权关系中存在的问题，揭示了中央和地方产权之间国有资产产权关系的本质，丰富和发展了中央与地方之间国有资产产权关系管理的思想，为构建新型的中央和地方之间国有资产产权关系模式提供理论指导和实践操作策略。

关键词：国有资产产权    国有资产管理    中央与地方产权关系

Abstract

The Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) explicitly defined that the reform of state-owned assets management system is the major task of deepening economic restructuring. Under the precondition of the state-owned property rights, bringing initiatives of the central and local governments into full play. China must establish central and local governments respectively served as the institutes representing the country to fulfill the accountabilities of investor, enjoy the ownership, returns and integrate responsibilities as well as to make the combination of the state-owned assets management system of assets management, personnel management and daily affairs management through formulation relevant laws and regulations. In this context, it is of vital theory and realistic significance to study the property right relationship between central and local governments.

This dissertation is composed of five parts: 1.Introduction; 2.The basic theories of property right relationship between central and local governments on the state-owned assets; 3.The history and status quo of property right relationship of state-owned assets between central and local governments; 4.Exprience and enlightenment: case study of property right relationship between central and local governments on state-owned assets; 5.Policy proposals of state-owned assets property right relationship reform. The main contents of this thesis are following:

State-owned economy is served as the basic tool for the country to conduct and promote social and economic development as well as the important guarantee to achieve the fundamental interests and common prosperity of Chinese people. As the key part of the economy of china, the development and expansion of state-owned economy plays a decisive role in reflecting the superiority of socialism and strengthening china’s economic strength, defense power and ethnic cohesion. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) assume the role of specific operators of national economy reflects the leading role of state-owned economy. After the adoption of reform and opening up policy, China has carried out a great variety of forms of public ownership in order to meet the requirements of market economy. SOEs continue to deepen reform and have made remarkable achievements.

At the mean time, China’s state-owned assets supervision and administration system reform is at its key stage, which is a constant deepening and developing process. After the founding of new China, as a part of planning economy, state-owned assets administration system allowed the government to have the rights on behalf of all Chinese people to have the ownership of state-owned assets and entrust central and local governments to administer the state-owned assets. Although central and local governments do not clearly stipulate which state-owned assets are under their jurisdiction, in the long term operation, central enterprises are under jurisdiction of central governments so are the local enterprises under local governments. Which sorts of enterprises are under the jurisdiction of central governments or local governments have often changed over the past decades. The decentralized administration reform of central and local governments begin with the issue of SOEs administration. The state-owned assets are either managed by local governments at various levels under the precondition of integration and organization by central governments or managed by central government and power division carried on between central and local governments. But in overall, it is “unite all property rights of state-owned assets and diversify the management by central and local governments” for a long period.

After the Sixteenth Congress, China has made theoretical breakthrough on state-owned assets management, which is reflected in the ownership theory that the central government unify the overall property right of state-owned assets and the central and local governments at various levels fulfill the responsibilities of investors respectively. The thought is conductive to reasonable power division、appropriate centralization and evident rights and responsibilities as well as motivating both central and local governments. Steady progress has been made in the practice of state-owned assets management reform. The organizing framework of new state-owned assets supervision and administration organs was set up. The laws and regulations of state-owned assets supervision and administration are further improved. The performance evaluation system of state-owned assets economic responsibilities has been established and implemented. The fundamental management of state-owned assets as well as supervision and management of state-owned property right transaction are intensified.

The final ownership of state-owned property right of central and local governments belongs to the state in the new state-owned assets management system. Therefore, the fundamental interests are the same. The property right interests’ mechanism between central and local governments may be different owing to different investors. So we can safely reach the conclusion that the property rights relationship of state-owned assets between central and local governments is not only different from market property right relationship but also from the affiliated administration relationship in the former system. The property right relationship between central and local governments is impossible to be cleared up for the reason that the reform of the new state-owned assets management system is at the initial stage and the relevant institutional construction do not keep pace with the reform. Therefore, China must exploit interior institutional reasons and formulate and carry out the relevant reform in light of the problems in the property right relationship between central and local governments.

This dissertation has summarized the problems existing in the property right relationship of state-owned assets between central and local governments through field research on Jiangxi Copper Company Limited, Jiangxi Rare Earth and Rare Metals Tungsten Group Co., Ltd, Changhe Automobile Company. These problems include the unsound transaction mechanism in state-owned property right between central and local governments and interest conflicts of property right entity and unreasonable property right division between central and local governments. These problems will increase the transaction costs of property right of state-owned assets between central and local governments as well as diminish state-owned property right efficiency and the compatibility between state-owned property right relationship of central and local governments and market economy system.

Reasonable arrangement of state-owned property right system should meet the following requirements in light of institutional evolution theory, productivity evaluation criteria of the Marxist theory of property rights and transaction costs theory, contract theory, enterprise’s controlling and obtaining theory and government function theory of western property rights theory

1.Property rights entity must be definite, the boundary must be clearly defined,

2.Property rights must flow freely, which demand property right entity to be diversified. Property rights can’t be transacted and market mechanism can’t be operated effectively without diversified property rights entity.

3.The enterprise’s interior mix must properly organized and establish good corporation management system.

4.Property rights and transaction must be under the protection of relevant laws.

5.The portfolio of property rights and the evolution of its mix must be conductive to raising the economic efficiency of the enterprises.

With the above-mentioned theoretical conclusions, we attribute the problems in state-owned property rights relationship between central and local governments to the inadequate public ownership property right system and relevant delayed institutional reform. To be specific, these problems include unreasonable powers and responsibilities of central and local governments, unsound fiscal and taxation system, delayed social security system reform and deletion of coordination mechanisms of state-owned property rights interests.

This dissertation initiates the target、principle and overall thought of state-owned assets property rights relationship reform on the basis of the historical evolution、the status quo、theory analysis and case study of state-owned property rights relationship of state-owned assets between central and local governments.

The target of property right relationship reform of central and local governments: Reasonably defining the boundary of central and local state-owned assets、clarifying the  powers and responsibilities and compatible coordination development relationship of market economy system. To ensure the realization of this target, we must conform to the following principles in the future reform process: the principle of maximizing overall efficiency of state-owned capital, taking into account the interests of the central and local government and as equal investors in the market of state-owned capital.

Outlook of state-owned assets property rights relationship reform:

1.      Establishing a sound system of modern state-owned property rights. Property rights theory and practice in China have indicated that the sound property right system is the basis for effective resources allocation, and establishment of state-owned property right system in the line with modern market economy is inevitable issue of economic system reform. In order to restructure the state-owned property right system, we should ascertain property right, differentiate the rights and obligation between property right boundary and its entity, eradicate the former blur state and establish favorable assets restriction mechanism of optimized social resources allocation. At present, some salient problems existing in china’s economic restructuring and operation have direct or indirect relations with the delayed reform. Therefore, only by establishing new state-owned assets management system and improving modern state-owned property right system can we build modern enterprise system in interior SOEs, which is the basis for clearing up the state-owned property right relationship between central and local governments.

2. Clearly defining the border of state-owned assets between central and local governments. In accordance with the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Congress, large size SOEs、infrastructure and important natural resources which relates to the lifeline of the national economy and national security. The central government on behalf of the state performs the duties of investors; the local governments perform the duties of investors over other state-owned assets. For the reason that the reform of central and local state-owned enterprise has not been completed, particularly the existence of scattered industries layout of central enterprises and internal inefficient issues, which are still in the phase of restructuring and reorganization situation. Central state-owned capital involve in the scopes will be shrinking and condensed, to realize landing points of central state-owned capital on the “controlling, influence, driving force” of national economy lies in reasonable industrial lay-out of central enterprises, is to define the economic realm central enterprise will enter and the depth of the realm. The adjustment of property rights relationship will inevitably occur during the process of restructuring of the central enterprises between the central and local governments, which are the important contents of adjusting the layout of the national economy, and also a way for improving the state-owned assets management system. The adjustment of state-owned assets between the central and local governments is a two-way that is transformation of the central state-owned assets into local state-owned assets or local state-owned assets into central asset that the former is superior, with transformation route including the allocation and market transactions.

3. Defining the powers and obligations of central government for state-owned assets. Under the framework “The state unify all the property rights, the central and local governments exercise property right respectively, special organs supervise the operation of property rights, governments entrust relevant departments to operate property rights” of state-owned assets management system, the central government perform the duties of central state-owned assets investors and have the function powers for disposal, management and assessment. At present, the State Council, the SASAC supervise important central enterprises, entrust parts of the larger enterprises and enterprise groups in authorized operation. Therefore, the central government’s powers and obligation for state-owned assets mainly manifests further enhancement of state-owned assets representative efficiency、promotion of central enterprises reshuffle as well as clearance up of transformation route between operating and non-operating assets. At the same time, the State Council, also on behalf of national unity exercise ultimate ownership of state-owned assets.

4. Defining the powers and obligation of local governments for state-owned assets. New state-owned assets management system firmly establishes the local governments as the leading investor entity and expands the local governments’ powers and scopes of allocating resources, spurs the local governments’ enthusiasm for administering state-owned assets, which are conductive to promoting the rationalization of local state-owned assets’ strategic patterns. However, the contradiction is inevitable for local governments’ double role―both investors and administers as a result of local governments must not only develop local economy but also maintain social stability. The investors’ powers of local governments are occupied to different extent by planning development department, fiscal department, personnel department as well as administrative department. Therefore, defining the specific responsibilities of local state-owned assets supervision and administration organs, establishing interior institution with the purpose of better fulfilling the investor’s responsibilities, clearing up the relationship between the supervision and administration organs and relevant governmental department, with which we can effectively promote the separation of local governments’ administration and investor’s responsibilities. The above-mentioned proposals are conductive to deepening the reform of local state-owned assets management system and promoting coordinated development of central and state-owned property right relationship.

5. Promoting the flowing of central and local property right. Central and local stateCowned property right flowing is definite requirement for adjusting state economic lay-out and improving stateCowned company management structure. The property right flowing forms include administrative allocation and market mechanism. With the deepening reshuffle of central enterprises, it is more ubiquitous that flowing between central and local stateCowned property right. Therefore, combining the promotion of reform in SOEs holding system and improvement of SOEs interior mechanism, accelerating reform in share holding, exploiting the restructuring forms of local stateCowned assets’ participation in central enterprises as well as building the flowing interest coordinated mechanism of central and local stateCowned property right, which are of vital significance for solving the internal mechanism of SOEs and promoting the flowing of central and local stateCowned property right.

6. Realizing “local governments administer relevant property rights” is the periodical goal for property right relationship reform between central and local governments. China’s current stateCowned assets management system conform to the principle of “the state enjoy all property rights and local governments fulfill the investors’ responsibilities” only taking into account of economy, the main purpose of establishing the system of “local governments fulfill the investors’ responsibilities” is to make government at high level (particularly the central government) flexible in its action and intensify its control and regulation. However, this sort of system may have an impact on the enthusiasm of governments at lower level as investors. Therefore, judging from the points of property right and management efficiency, realizing the reform goal of “governments at various levels possess the relevant property rights” of central and local stateCowned assets. In other words, central and local governments are completely equal stateCowned assets property rights entity in the market meaning.

The reform of property right relationship of state-owned assets between the central and local governments is just a part of the reform of China’s state-owned asset management system project. Therefore, some supporting reform are needed.

In this paper, the innovations aspects are following:

1. Breakthrough the traditional micro perspective to study state-owned property rights. Under the new state-owned assets management system of “The state unify all the property rights, central and local governments exercise the responsibilities of investors respectively”, integrating property rights theory, entrusting-agency theory and the theory of government functions and thoughts of state-owned assets management, From the new perspective, the nature of the problem, the reasons for the reform ideas, will not only better reflect China's state-owned assets management system reform ideas, also promote the further deepening of structural reform in state-owned assets management, and conform to the restructuring of the practical needs of central and local state-owned enterprise.

2. The reform objective of state-owned assets property right relationship between central and local governments: establishing reasonable borders of central and local state-owned assets, clarify the powers and responsibilities of central and local governments compatible with market economy system and the central and local property rights’ coordinating development relations are of pioneering meaning. The ultimate ownership of central and local state-owned assets belong to the state, their final target is the same with different investing representatives. Therefore, the relationships between them are neither ordinary market relations nor quasi-administrative one. Establishing the basic principles in the line with the market economy, reasonable capital boundaries as well as a clear responsibilities of investors between central and local property right coordinated development relations is the requirements for the new state-owned asset management system and have also enriched the content of the study of the state-owned property rights theory and China's state-owned assets management theory.

3. We propose a four-level state-owned assets management system in order to thoroughly separate enterprises from governments as well as capitals from governments programmed to the designed flaw of state-owned assets management system. The current state-owned assets management system hasn’t completely solved the problem of the separation of enterprises and governments. The State Council, the SASAC also shoulder the administrative functions, such institutional weaknesses will gradually appear in the future reform. Therefore, this dissertation presents the four-level of state-owned assets management system, which is conductive to promoting the separation of enterprises and political capital and establishing a market economy system compatible with the central and local state-owned property rights relationship.

This dissertation mainly focused in-depth studies on the state-owned assets property right relationship between the central and local governments and the research results significance both in theoretically and practically. From the theoretical value, in order to promote the reform of state-owned assets property right relationship between central and local governments as the starting point, combine the property rights theory, entrust―agency theory and state-owned asset management theory to analysis the problem of state-owned assets property rights relationship between central and local governments and propose overall targets and thoughts of property right relationship reform between the central and local governments, which have promoted further development China's state-owned assets management system and enriched the property rights theory, the administration management and public choice theory of project-related research content of academic field. From the practical significance, diagnosis and analysis of the existing problems in central and local property rights relationship, and reveals the nature of property rights between the central and local state-owned property rights relationship, which enriching and developing the thinking of state-owned assets property right relationship between central and local governments, providing theoretical guidance and practical operation strategy of establishing the new state-owned assets property right relationship mode between central and local governments.

Key words: property rights of state-owned assets; state-owned assets management;

the property rights relationship between central and local governments